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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 3 5-1-67 (1975) is the 
determinative statute in this case. It is set forth in full in the 
Addendum hereto as Exhibit A. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY 
As a result of an industrial injury, Mr. Zupon is no longer 
able to be employed in any well-known branch of the labor market. 
Although he undeniably has other medical problems, it was his 
industrial injury which rendered him unable to work. Due to his 
advanced age, limited education and other health problems, he is 
not a suitable candidate for vocational rehabilitation and is a 
classic "odd-lot" doctrine case. Since this case arises under pre-
1988 law, the "odd-lot" doctrine applies and Kaiser Steel 
Corporation had the burden of finding a line of employment which he 
could perform. The employer in this case has wholly failed to meet 
that burden. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the 
Administrative Law Judge are deficient in that they are not 
detailed enough to meet legal requirements. The Industrial 
Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review, which is the Order on 
appeal, is even more deficient in failing to engage in proper fact 
finding. 
This Court should summarily reverse the Industrial 
Commission's final agency action, by ruling that Mr. Zupon was 
entitled to the presumption afforded by the "odd-lot" doctrine, as 
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it was not rebutted, as a matter of law in this case. Failing sue] 
a ruling, this matter should be remanded to the Industrial 
Commission for more detailed Findings of Fact and Conclusions oJ 
Law, 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO APPLY THE "ODD LOT" 
DOCTRINE TO PETITIONERS PERMANENT, TOTAL DISABILITY 
CLAIM, AND SUCH APPLICATION RESULTS IN A PRESUMPTION OF 
ENTITLEMENT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN REBUTTED. 
A. APPLICATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 
Respondents have completely misconstrued Petitioner's argument 
in regard to the applicable burden of proof. Petitioner does not 
dispute that he has the burden of demonstrating medical and legal 
causation by a preponderance of the evidence. Petitioner's 
argument on this point, however, is that the Workers' Compensation 
Act is to be "liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits and 
any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of 
the claim." See, e.g., McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 
153, 155 (Utah 1977). 
Petitioner raises this point not as a "substitute for his 
burden of proof" as Respondents argue, but rather to show that the 
Industrial Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review did not 
evidence the "humane and beneficent purposes" required by the law. 
Petitioner accepts his burden of proof to demonstrate medical and 
legal causation; he only argues that in meeting that burden, such 
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doubt as does exist in the record is to be resolved in his favor. 
Respondents do not deny this well established principal of 
construction of workers' compensation law. 
The second basis of Petitioner's argument is that under the 
so-called "odd-lot" doctrine, once Petitioner had proved his 
disability and inability to be rehabilitated, the burden then 
shifted to the employer to find regular, steady work which he could 
perform. In order to fully appreciate the application of the "odd-
lot" doctrine it is helpful to understand it's development and the 
factual context to which it has been applied. 
B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE "ODD-LOT" DOCTRINE. 
Perhaps the first case to discuss the concept of the "odd-lot" 
doctrine was the English case of Cardiff Corporation v. Hall, 1 KB 
1009 (1911): 
There are cases in which the burden of shewing suitable 
work can in fact be obtained does fall up the employer. 
... [If]... the capacities for work left to him fit him 
only for special uses and do not ... make his powers of 
labour a merchantable article in some well known lines of 
the labor market....[I]t is incumbent upon the employer 
to shew that such special employment can in fact be 
obtained by him.... flf 1 the accident leaves the workman's 
labour in the position of an "odd-lot" in the labor 
market, the employer must shew that a customer can be 
found who will take it .... (Emphasis added). 
Judge Cordozo very early in the history of workmen's 
compensation in the United States, set the policy for odd-lot 
determination: 
He was an unskilled or common laborer. He coupled his 
request for employment with notice that labor must be 
light. The applicant imposing such conditions is quickly 
put aside for more versatile competitors. Business has 
little patience with the suitor for ease and favor. He 
is the 'odd-lot' man, the nondescript in the labor 
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market. Work, if he gets it. is likely to be casual and 
intermittent...Rebuff. if suffered, might reasonably be 
ascribed to the narrow opportunities that await the sick 
and halt. Jordan v. Decorative Co.. 130 N.E. 635, 636 
(N.Y. App. 1921). (Emphasis added). 
Professor Larson in his oft cited treatise on workmen's 
compensation law describes this doctrine, as follows: 
Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is accepted in 
virtually every jurisdiction, total disability may be 
found in the case of workers who, while not altogether 
incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they will 
not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the 
labor market. The essence of the test is the probable 
dependability with which claimant can sell his services 
in a competitive labor market, undistorted by such 
factors as business booms, sympathy of a particular 
employer or fiends, temporary good luck, or the 
superhuman efforts of the claimant to rise above his 
crippling handicaps. 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation. § 57.51 at 10-164.24 (1992). (Footnotes 
omitted). (Emphasis added). 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE IN UTAH. 
The "odd-lot" doctrine has been accepted and favorably applied 
by the Utah Courts. One of the first modern Utah cases applying 
the doctrine was Brundage v. IML Freight. Inc.. 622 P.2d 790 (Utah 
1980) where the injured worker had spent thirty years as a truck 
driver. In August of 1975, he injured his back in a non-industrial 
accident which led to surgery later that year. In October, 1976, 
he had recovered sufficiently to return to his job as a truck 
driver. He subsequently reinjured his back in the course and scope 
of his employment and in 1977 again underwent surgery on his back. 
Several months later, however, he re-injured his back in another 
non-industrial accident and was thereafter unable to return to 
work. 
The Industrial Commission found Mr. Brundage suffered from a 
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30% permanent partial impairment, half of which was attributable to 
the industrial injury, and half of which was attributable to 
nonindustrial causes. Mr. Brundage was awarded permanent partial 
impairment benefits, but his claim for permanent total disability 
was denied. 
In reversing the Industrial Commission's ruling regarding 
permanent total disability, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In his treatise, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, 
Professor Arthur Larson states: 
'total disability' in compensation law is not 
to be interpreted literally as utter and 
abject helplessness.... The task is to phrase 
a rule delimiting the amount and character of 
work a [person] can be able to do without 
forfeiting his totally disabled status. 2 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation. § 
57.51 at 10-107 (1992). 
Consonant with the view expressed by Larson, the 
Supreme Court has adopted the following definition of 
total disability: 
This Court has recognized the principle that a 
workman may be found totally disabled if by 
reason of the disability resulting from his 
injury he cannot perform work of the general 
character he was performing when injured, or 
any other work which a fperson] of his 
capabilities may be able to do or to learn to 
do. . . . United Park City Mines Co. v. 
Prescott, 393 P.2d 800, 801-802 (1964). 
(Emphasis added). 
The next important decision was Entwistle v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 
495 (Utah 1981). Mr. Wilkins, who was 55 years old at the time of 
his industrial injury, sold trailers and other types of 
recreational vehicles which required him to travel throughout the 
west contacting dealers. In 1977, he suffered an industrial injury 
to his back while on a business trip when he slipped and struck his 
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back on some large rocks while attempting to unhitch a trailer. He 
was off work for some time while undergoing physical therapy, and 
although he later return to light duty, he was eventually unable tc 
continue because of pain. In defining the term "total disability," 
the Court stated as follows: 
...'total disability' does not mean a state of abject 
helplessness or that the injured employee must be unable 
to do any work at all. The fact that an injured employee 
may be able to do some kinds of tasks to earn occasional 
wages does not necessarily preclude a finding of total 
disability to perform the work or follow the occupation 
in which he was injured. His temporary disability may be 
found to be total if he can no longer perform the duties 
of the character required in his occupation prior to his 
injury. Id at 498. (Citations omitted). (Emphasis 
added). 
The "odd-lot" doctrine was next considered in the monumental 
case of Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 
1984) . The Applicant was employed by Emery Mining Company as a 
maintenance mechanic in a coal mine. While leaving the mine in the 
back of a tractor-trailer, he was bounced up and down on the seat 
causing an injury to his back. After several months of 
conservative medical treatment, Mr. Marshall underwent surgery. 
Following surgery he was advised by his doctor that he could not 
return to work. Mr. Marshall was 67 years of age at the time. 
The Industrial Commission awarded Mr. Marshall permanent 
partial impairment compensation finding he sustained a 10% whole 
body permanent, partial impairment due to the industrial accident 
and 15% due to pre-existing conditions. However, the Commission 
refused his request for permanent total disability stating the 
primary reason he was unable to return to work was his age. 
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The Utah Supreme Court reversed the Industrial Commission 
ruling that Mr. Marshall was entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits under the "odd-lot" doctrine. 
The Court defined permanent total disability as follows: 
TA1 workman may be found totally disabled if by reason of 
the disability resulting from his injury he cannot 
perform work of the general character he was performing 
when injured, or any other work which a man of his 
capabilities may be able to do or to learn to do. . . . 681 
P.2d at 211. (Emphasis added). 
The Court further stated: 
Disability is evaluated not in the abstract, but in terms 
of the specific individual who has suffered a work-
related injury. An injury to a hand would not cause the 
same degree of disability in a teacher, for example, as 
it would in an electrician. Thus, in assessing the loss 
of earning capacity, a constellation of factors must be 
considered, only one of which is the physical impairment. 
Other factors are age, education, training and mental 
capacity. It is the unique configuration of these 
factors that together will determine the impact of the 
impairment on the individual's earning capacity. JDd. at 
211. (citations omitted). 
Some employees, however, cannot be rehabilitated and 
even though not in a state of abject helplessness ' can 
no longer perform the duties . . . required in [their] 
occupation[s].' These employees fall into the so-called 
'odd-lot' category... Whether or not an employee falls 
into the odd-lot category depends on whether there is 
regular, dependable work available for the employee who 
does not rely on the sympathy of friends or his own super 
human efforts. Once the employee has presented evidence 
that he can no longer perform the duties reguired in his 
occupation and that he cannot be rehabilitated, the 
burden shifts to the employer to prove the existence of 
regular, steady work that the employee can perform, 
taking into account the employee's education, mental 
capacity and age. ... 'It is much easier for the 
[employer] to prove the employability of the [employee] 
for a particular job than for the [employee] to try to 
prove the universal negative of not being employable at 
any work.' Id at 212-213. (Citations omitted). (Emphasis 
added). 
Finally, the Court pointed out that the majority of odd-lot 
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cases are concerned with employees whose work involved physical 
labor, were 50 years of age and older, and had moderate or littl* 
education, similar to the Petitioner herein. Id. at 212. 
In Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 P.2d 132: 
(Utah 1986) , the Plaintiff, who was sixty years old with a limitec 
education and even more limited work background, suffered c 
fractured skull when a steel beam fell and stuck him on the head. 
A Medical Panel found that he had a 25% whole body permanent, 
partial impairment, with 15% being related to the industrial injur} 
and 10% being related to pre-existing conditions. He requested 
permanent, total disability benefits based on his overall physical 
impairment, as well as his age and lack of education and skills. 
Despite the request, the Industrial Commission awarded onli 
permanent, partial impairment compensation. 
In finding that the Plaintiff had presented a prima facie case 
of permanent, total disability, the Court stated: 
The Commission's findings failed to acknowledge the odd-
lot doctrine accepted in most jurisdictions and which has 
been repeatedly approved by this Court. That doctrine 
recognized the substantial difference between physical 
impairment and disability. For example, a low percentage 
of physical impairment is not per se less than total 
permanent disability. Numerous other courts applying the 
odd-lot doctrine have found permanent total disability 
despite a deceptively low percentage of physical 
impairment.... The odd lot doctrine further requires an 
evaluation of disability in terms of the specific 
individual who has suffered work-related injury.... 
Absent proof of employment reasonably available to one in 
the odd-lot category, the injured employee should be 
classified as totally disabled. Id. at 1326-1327. 
(Citations omitted). (Emphasis added). 
In Norton v. Industrial Commission, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986), 
decided shortly after the Hardman case, the Supreme Court 
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reiterated it's holding in Hardman as follows: 
As in Hardman,.•. the Commission again failed in this 
case to carry out its tasks. It adopted with slight 
modification the findings of impairment reported by the 
medical panel but then failed in its administrative 
responsibility and function to evaluate Norton's 
permanent disability which should have included such 
factors as Norton's 'present and future ability to engage 
in gainful activity' as it is affected by such diverse 
factors as age, sex, education, economic and social 
environment, in addition to the definite medical factor-
permanent impairment. Id. at 1027. 
Upon remand the Commission is required to address 
Norton's disability in light of all factors mentioned 
ante, and the burden will be on the employer to prove the 
existence of regular, steady work that Norton could 
perform, taking into account his age, limited education 
and functional illiteracy as well as his disabling pain. 
Id. at 1028. (Emphasis added). 
In Peck v. Eimco Process Equipment Co, , J 31 
1987), the injured worker was employed as an industrial maintenance 
mechanic for the defendant. He suffered * > industrial injuries 
which together resulted in a permanent pari . •; impairment of 1 2% on 
a whole body basis Following surgery, he returned to work with 
light duty restrictions. He retired approximately one year latter 
at age 65 and at that time requested that he be awarded permanent, 
total disability compensation. Although the Administrative Law 
Judge approved permanent total compensation, the Industrial 
Commission reversed. 
The Utah Supreme Court overruled the Industrial Commission's 
df»c i s ion 11111J r cj> 1 nst at ed t tip Aiiin j 1111 st 1 at i vrj Law Jutihff ,. r u 1 1 nq , 
citing approvingly the Norton, Marshall and Hardman decisions. 
Finally, in the recent case of Zimmermann v. Industrial 
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Commission, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah App. 1989), the Court stated: 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the 'odd lot doctrine' 
which allows the Commission to find permanent total 
disability when a relatively small percentage of 
impairment caused by an industrial accident is combined 
with other factors to render the claimant unable to 
obtain employment. Id. at 1131. (citations omitted). 
* * * 
Hardman sets forth the following steps for qualification 
under the 'odd-lot' doctrine; (1) the employee must 
prove that he or she can no longer perform the duties 
required in his or her occupation; (2) the employee, 
having been referred to the Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation by the Industrial Commission, must, 
through cooperation with the Division, establish that he 
or she cannot be rehabilitated; and (3) the burden then 
shifts to the employee to prove the existence of steady 
work the employee can perform, taking into account 
several factors, including the employee's education, 
mental capacity, and age. Id. at 1131. (Citations 
omitted). (Emphasis added). 
D. APPLICATION OF FACTS TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE 0DD-L01 
DOCTRINE. 
As initially stated in Hardman and clarified in Zimmermann 
there are three steps required for the application of the odd-lot 
doctrine: (1) the employee must prove that he can no longer perforin 
the duties required in his or her occupation; (2) the employee must 
prove that he cannot be rehabilitated; and (3) the employer then 
has the burden to prove the existence of regular, steady work the 
employee can perform. If the employer can not do so, the injured 
worker is entitled to permanent, total disability compensation as 
an "odd-lot11 injured worker. 
A review of each of those elements discloses that the first 
two are satisfied in this case, but the Employer failed in its 
burden to find a job that Mr. Zupon could do or learn to do. 
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1. Inability to perform the duties required in his 
occupation. 
Both the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission spend a ] ot of time attempting to prove that I t was Mr, 
Zupon's other medicd 1 cond i t ions wh n In pr evented h :ii s return to 
work; however, for the purpose of the "odd-lot" doctrine medical 
causation is irrelevant. The only relevant issue at this stage is 
whether Mr. Zupon could continues to perform the type of work; that 
he was performing prior to being injured, For this reason, the 
r a 11 ona .1 o f 11 i e s o c i a 1 S e c\ i ^  i ty Adm i n i s t r a t ion is tot a 1 ly 
irrelevant to the consideration or the applicability of the "odd-
lot" doctrine. None of tt\* parties seriously argue that Mr. Zupon 
can r • -1 • ••• -» ^h 
the Administrative Law Judge's decision Mr. Zupon was a
 rea> Did 
man who had not worked since 1975, (R. at 22, 29). 
. '. Ii: :i .ulilit ion fiinil most siqnjf iranl ly Mi uiipon dull in 
fact attempt to return to work after his industrial injury, and was 
denied other jobs because he could not pass the required physicals 
due to his back problems. (R. at 29) . That testimony was 
uncontroverted. The Administrative Law Judge found that he had not 
worked since iy/o, ior a total of almost. ± / years. (K. at. 2- The 
Medical Panel appointed by the Industrial Commission specifically 
agreed with Mr. Zupon's treating physician " , that the claimant 
c n: - *•.»*-., .;,-». •' ami further referenced his 
inability to work. (R. Respondents did not present any 
evidence that following his industrial injury Mr. Zupon was capable 
1± 
of performing the duties required in his occupation. 
He was paid temporary, total disability compensation until 
February 1976, when he began receiving disability pension benefits 
from his union. Subsequently, he received Social Securit] 
disability benefits and a Veteran's disability pension. (R. at 29) 
And finally, the Utah Supreme Court in Norton, supra, helc 
significantly as follows: 
Provided that worker's disability was also analyzed with 
the framework of the odd-lot doctrine, case law dealing 
with the factor of substantial pain has general held that 
'[a] worker who cannot return to any gainful employment 
without suffering substantial pain is entitled to 
compensation benefits for total disability.' (Citations 
omitted). Id. at 1028. 
2. INABILITY TO BE REHABILITATED. 
Due to the Industrial Commission's finding that Mr. Zupon hac 
failed to establish the necessary causation between his impairment 
and his industrial accident, a rehabilitation evaluation was not 
ordered by the Industrial Commission. Nevertheless it is difficult 
to argue that in light of his health, age and limited educatior 
that Mr. Zupon could be vocationally rehabilitated. 
There is no evidence in this case that the Employer die 
anything to enhance Mr. Zupon7s employment possibilities, and ir 
fact, the uncontroverted evidence is to the effect that it simply 
declined to permit him to return to work as a coal miner, and took 
no further actions whatsoever to assist him in locating suitable 
employment. 
The evidence is clear and overwhelming that following his 
industrial injury Mr. Zupon could not be rehabilitated for 
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meaningful an**. sustained employment, and the Employer failed to 
assist him in .5; . way1 111 mloiiKj so. 
EXISTENCE OF REGULAR, STEADY WORK THE EMPLOYEE CAN 
PERFORM. 
Once the injured worker has satisfied ejemeritis ('( ana \2) 
above, the burden then shifts to the Employer to prove the 
existence nf leqular steady work the employee can perform, taking 
into account several factors, including the employee's education, 
mental capacity, and age, Hardman, at 132 7. The Respondent 
Emp] oyer I: las 1 lot made ev ei: 1 a pretence of maki ng si ich a showi 1 ig i n 
this case. This failure undoubtedly resulted from the fact that in 
this case such a burden simply could n*.* re net . Given Mr. Zupon's 
advanced age, sever e hea] tl: 1 pi: ol .-•:.--•; • • *c:i edi icati 01 1, there 
is simply no steady work he can now perform, or that he could be 
retrained to learn to do, a w uic Employer does not argue 
otherwise. 
Therefore, Mr. £upon has established his entitlement to 
permanent tot. a I d i s a b i 1 :ii t/y as an "odd lot" injured worker. The 
presumption inherent i n that doctrine has not been rebutted as a 
matter of law, and an appropriate award of benefits should be 
issued. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO PROPERLY REVIEW THIS 
MATTER AND ITS ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW IS LEGALLY 
DEFICIENT AND MUST BE REVERSED. 
The Industrial Commission was required to consider the Motion 
for Review in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
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63-46b-12(6)(c) (1988), which provides as follows: 
The order on review shall contain: 
(i) a designation of the statute or rule 
permitting or requiring review; 
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed; 
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the 
issues reviewed; 
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the 
issues reviewed; 
(v) the reasons for the disposition; 
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding 
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed, 
or modified, and whether all or any portion of 
the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded; 
(vii) a notice of any right of further 
administrative reconsideration or judicial 
review available* to aggrieved parities; and 
(viii) the time limits applicable to any 
appeal or review. 
A review of the Industrial Commission's Order Denying Motior 
for Review, a copy of which is attached hereto in the Addendum as 
Exhibit B, reveals that it is wholly deficient in this regard and 
does not meet recent legal requirements. No specific Findings are 
made. Rather, the Industrial Commission merely summarized, with 
editorial comments, the evidence presented and the Administrative 
Law Judge's action. Such summary conclusions do not constitute 
proper fact-finding. In the recent case of Adams v. Board of 
Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991), the Court stated as follows: 
While the purported bindings of Fact7 written by 
the A.L.J, contain an informative summary of the evidence 
presented, such a rethearsal of contradictory evidence 
does not constitute findings of fact. In order for a 
finding to truly constitute a 'finding of fact,' it must 
indicate what the A.L.J, determines in fact occurred.... 
The evidence did not merely indicate two possible 
versions of a fact whereby we could conclude that the 
denial of benefits necessarily indicates that the 
Commission accepted one version over another. The 
evidence shows several possible configurations and 
degrees of injury and/or disease, if any, and the causes, 
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if any, thereby creating a matrix of possible factual 
findings. A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in 
this case therefore does not give a clear indication of 
the A.L.J.'s or the Commission's view as to what in fact 
occurred. Since we cannot even determine why the 
Commission found there was no causation shown, we clearly 
cannot assume that the Commission actually made any of 
the possible subsidiary findings. The findings are 
therefore inadequate. Id. at 20. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently informed the Industrial 
Commission, further, that: 
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of 
the Commission, the findings must be 'sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached.' Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. DaIton, 598 P.2d 
1336 (Utah 1979))...[T]he failure of an agency to make 
adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its 
findings 'arbitrary and capricious' unless the evidence 
is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one 
conclusion.' Id. (quoting Kinkella v. Baucrh, 660 P-2d 
233, 236 (Utah 1983)). 
Nvrehn v. Industrial Commission, 8 00 I , 335 (Utah Aj \ 
1990), cert, denied. 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991 
The Industrial Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review is 
specifically deficient i n that i t fal ] s to make specific w 
sufficient findings on the issue of medical causation Although 
none of the parties, including the Administrative Law Judge, 
dispute that Petitioner is presently permanently and totally 
disabled, neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the Industrial 
Commissi* pecif ied the degree to whi ch that disabil i ty was caused 
by the 1975 industrial injury. The Industrial Commission (even 
with reference to the Administrative Law Judge's insufficient 
Findi ngs) maker; rone ii;e f inditiqs w\ i ts 
Petitioner's current medical condition and the causes for it, That 
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failure manifests itself here in inadequate Findings. 
The duty to make proper Findings of Fact and Conclusions ol 
Law is that of the Industrial Commission, in addition to, anc 
beyond that, made by the Administrative Law Judge. The Respondents 
have only made a half-hearted attempt to defend the Administrative 
Law Judged Findings and limit their defense of the Industrial 
Commission's Findings to the single sentence "The Commission's 
findings, though more brief than those of the ALJ, are clear, 
consistent and are supported by substantial evidence". 
(Respondent's Brief at 19). That is indeed faint praise. 
Findings are evaluated not as to whether they are "clear and 
consistent." Rather, "the findings must be sufficiently detailed 
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Nyrehr 
v. Industrial Commission, supra at 335. The evidence here was not 
"capable of only one conclusion" and thus the Industrial 
Commission's inadequate findings renders its Order Denying Motion 
for Review "arbitrary and capricious". 
The Industrial Commission's, as well as the Administrative Lav; 
Judge's, purported Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
should at a minimum be vacated and remanded with instructions to 
enter a new Order with detailed and subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was reached. Failure to 
do so, denies Petitioner the ability to marshall the evidence in 
support of the findings and show that it is not substantial. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P. 2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App. 
16 
1989) . 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that 
the Industrial Commission erred when it entered ir August 3r 1992 
Order dismissing Mr. Zupon's clai m for permai ler *. *abi ! ity 
benefits for lack of medical causation. Mr. Zupon is entitled to 
benefits under the "odd-lot doctrine as a matter of law. 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand 
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to award 
hi int permai lei it, total d :ii sabj 1 i ty benef i ts based « ~:he 
uncontroverted facts .and medical evidence presented. 
DATED this 24th day of May, 3 9 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A; Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1975). 
EXHIBIT B: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
(March 18, 1992). 
EXHIBIT C; Order Denying Motion for Review (August, 3, 1992). 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability—Amount of payments—Vocational 
rehabilitation—Procedure and payments.—In eases of permanent total dis-
ability the employee shall receive 662/3% of his average weekly wages at 
the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less 
than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent wife and $5 for 
each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. 
However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or 
its insurance carrier be required to pay such weekly compensation pay-
ments for more than 312 weeks; and provided further, that a finding by 
the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative 
and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been had: 
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and 
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of 
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under 
the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the 
duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation 
division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1), not 
to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such em-
ployee; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally 
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the 
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the 
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education 
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah and m writing that such 
employee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilita-
tion in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division 
the employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order 
that there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 66%% 
of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than 
a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 
for a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the 
age of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor 
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the 
time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week out of that special fund provided 
for by section 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with the 
time that the payments (as in this section provided) to be made by the 
employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of 
the employee. No employee, however, shall be entitlied to any such benefits 
if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the division of vocational rehabili-
tation as set forth herein. 
EXHIBIT A 
Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally 
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation 
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) shall 
be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $60 per week. 
Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who were permanently and totally 
disabled on or before March 5, 1949, and were receiving compensation 
benefits and continue to receive such benefits shall be paid compensation 
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) at a rate 
sufficient to bring their weekly benefit to $60 when combined with employer 
or insurance carrier compensation payments. 
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of 
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commis-
sion of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon 
the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to 
be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such re-
habilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both 
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall 
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to 
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total 
disability shall be required in such instances; in all jftther cases, however, 
and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent 
disability. 
Tn no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to 
pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as pro-
vided in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of 
function, in excess of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury per week for 312 weeks. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 91000568 
JOHN ZUPON, 
VS« 
Applicant, 
KAISER STEEL CORPORATION (Self-
Insured) /UNINSURED EMPLOYERS 
FUND and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE 
FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East 300 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 6, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock 
a.m. Said hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
BEFORE: Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and was represented by Virginius Dabney 
Attorney. 
The defendants, Kaiser Steel Corporation (Self-Insured) and/or 
Uninsured Employers Fund were not represented at the hearing. 
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by Erie Boorman, 
Administrator. 
This case involves a claim for permanent total disability benefits 
related to an August 7, 1975 industrial back accident. In a stipulation filed 
with the Industrial Commission on the day of the hearing, the parties stipulated 
that if permanent total disability benefits were awarded, the self-insured 
employer had only a 1/6 proportionate share liability in such an award and that 
this share had already been paid as between the employer and the Uninsured 
Employers Fund. As a result of the stipulation, only the Employers Reinsurance 
Fund had potential liability and thus the only defendant at the February 6, 1992 
hearing was the Employers Reinsurance Fund. 
Pursuant to the stipulation, the Employers Reinsurance Fund stipulated 
to a 5/6 proportionate share of liability if permanent total disability benefits 
are awarded. However, the Employers Reinsurance Fund (ERF) argued at hearing 
that the applicant is not entitled to an award of permanent total disability 
benefits. ERF argues that the industrial injury at issue contributed very little 
to the applicant's overall disability and that the 10% whole man impairment that 
a prior medical panel awarded to the applicant, as related to the August 7, 1975 
industrial accident, is not well founded. Even if there is a 10% whole man 
impairment related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident, ERF argues that 
that small amount, compared with the 50% whole man impairment that was found to 
be related to pre-existing ankylosing spondylitis, was a minor contribution to 
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the applicant's significant existing disability. ERF cites two cases which deal 
with injured employees whose permanent disabilities were found to have been 
caused by problems unrelated to the relatively minor compensable industrial 
injury involved. Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 713 (Utah 
1986), Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988). ERF also 
argues that it was the advancement of the arthritis to the applicant's hands and 
fingers, which occurred sometime after the industrial accident and was unrelated 
to the industrial accident, which caused the applicant to become truly disabled. 
ERF points to the Social Security Disability records as support for this 
argument. 
In a letter to the Employers Reinsurance Fund, dated February 5, 1992, 
the applicant's attorney summarized the basis for the applicant's claim of 
permanent total disability related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident. 
In referring to the causal connection between the industrial accident and the 
permanent total disability, that letter indicates that the applicant relies 
primarily on: 1) the failure to return to work after the August 7, 1975 
industrial accident and 2) the award of Social Security Disiability beginning 
January 1, 1977 with a primary diagnosis of ankylosis of the lumbar spine. The 
letter states: 
The Decision of the social Security Administration, 
Administrative Law Judge confirms that when the lumbar problem 
extended into Mr. Zupon's extremities causing him to lose hand 
and finger dexterity, he then became totally disabled. . . . 
Please also note that Mr. Zupon never had any problems with 
his arms, hands or fingers prior to the industrial accident, 
and that problems with regard to his extermitites were 
subsequent to that event. 
Based on the explanation above, the ALJ understands that the applicant claims 
that his hand and finger problmes are somehow related to the lumbar problem. 
After the hearing, the ALJ took the matter under advisement so that she 
could review the medical records submitted at hearing (Exhibit A-l). The matter 
was considered ready for order as soon as the records were reviewed. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant is a male who was 51 years old on the date of injury and 
who is currently 67 years old. The applicant's compensation rate has been set 
by prior Commission order at $155.00 per week (Exhibit E). At the time of the 
applicant's industrial injury, on August 7, 1975, the applicant was employed by 
Kaiser Coal Corporation in Sunnyside, Utah. He was working in mine #3 when he 
was injured. The applicant's duties at the mine included maintenance and repair 
of mechanical and electrical equipment and he was also the fireboss. On the date 
of injury, the applicant was lifting an acetylene tank which he described as 
being 5 feet long and 18 inches in diameter. The applicant estimated that the 
tank weighed around 200 pounds. As he started to lift the tank off the ground, 
the applicant's weight was not under the tank. The tank was off to the side of 
him and thus he was twisting as he lifted the tank. The applicant stated that 
he felt a sharp pain in his low back just below the beltline as he attempted to 
lift the tank. The applicant stated that he could hardly walk after that. 
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The applicant was seen the same day by Dr. S. Smoot at Carbon Medical 
Services Association in Dragerton, Utah. Dr. Smoot's medical report for that day 
indicates that X-rays were t,aken of the lumbar spine. The X-ray report indicates 
that the film was read to show extensive degenerative changes and early spur 
formation. Dr. Smoot decided to treat the applicant conservatively and he had 
the applicant return approximately a week later (the date on the office note is 
not legible). Per the office note for this follow-up visit, Dr. Smoot noted that 
the applicant had aches and pains all over his body at that time. Dr. Smoot 
noted that this was probably a generalized arthritic reaction. He prescribed 
some wygesic and butazolidine. On August 27, 1975, Dr. Smoot again saw the 
applicant and he noted that the applicant was feeling somewhat better, but that 
his generalized discomforts continued. He continued the applicant on the same 
medication. The September 3, 1975 office note indicates that the applicant was 
still complaining of pain in the back and shoulders and "all over." Dr. Smoot 
changed the applicant's medication and a week later he noted that the applicant 
was still having some pain inthe mid-thoracic and lumbar area. On September 17, 
1975, Dr. Smoot noted that the applicant's complaints remained the same and he 
gave the applicant instructions for exercises. In follow-up on September 24, 
1975, Dr. Smoot noted that the exercises had made the applicant feel worse and 
that at that time he even had pain in his ears. At the applicant's request, Dr. 
Smoot provided the applicant with additional pain medication. 
On October 1, 1975, Dr. Smoot saw the applicant again and he noted that 
the pain was worse in the shoulder. He re-X-rayed the lumbar spine and again 
noted only the degenerative changes. He indicated that the applicant would 
probably need an orthopedic consultation. This was not scheduled until later in 
the month and thus Dr. Smoot saw the applicant twice more. On October 7, 1975 
Dr. Smoot noted that the applicant had aches in all his joints. Dr. Smoot's 
office note for that date also indicates that the applicant had been talking to 
his brother-in-law who worked for Social Security. As a result, the applicant 
asked Dr. Smoot about being "totaled out." On that same day, the applicant filed 
his initial application for Social Security Disability benefits. The applicant 
saw Dr. Smoot one more time on October 15, 1975 and Dr. Smoot's note for that 
date indicates only that the applicant was feeling worse and that he was to see 
a Dr. E. Chapman on October 20, 1975 for an orthopedic consultation. 
Dr. Chapman's October 20, 1975 office note indicates that the 
applicant's treatment to that point had been limited to rest and medication. He 
noted that the applicant was having continued pain in the mid and lower spine 
with radiation to the hips (left greatexr than right), with neck pains and right 
arm pain. Dr. Chapman read X-rays of the dorsal spine, the lumbar spine and the 
pelvis to show arthritic spurring. His assessment was that the applicant was 
experiencing the residuals of an acute strain of the lower lumbar spine. He 
prescribed a book on back care, a Taylor back brace, a cervical pillow and he 
recommended that the applicant rest frequently and put a board under his 
mattress. When Dr. Chapman saw him again on October 24, 1975, he noted that the 
applicant had improved and had "taken to" the Taylor brace. Dr. Chapman's office 
note states that the applicant still had back pain and was quite certain that he 
could not return to his regular job at Kaiser. However, Dr. Chapman noted that 
the applicant was a master electrician and would be able to do other electrical 
work that was compatible with his limitations. Nonetheless, he did not release 
the applicant to return to work at that time. 
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When Dr. Chapman saw the applicant again on November 13, 1975, he noted 
that the applicant had experienced a recurrence of pain when he tried to be more 
active. He noted that the applicant's side talent as an electrician would not 
be helpful to him since it ,involved activities such as crawling in attics and 
pulling on conduit. He precribed darvon for the applicant and indicated he did 
not need to return for another 3 months, at which time he would be rated. He 
again indicated that the applicant was unable to return to work at that time. 
The next medical treatment noted in the medical records was an admit to 
Castleview Hospital from January 8, 1976 to January 13, 1976 for a 
hemorrhoidectomy. The applicant saw Dr. Chapman again on February 2, 1976 and 
Dr. Chapman noted that the applicant was progressively getting worse with pain 
throughout his lumbar spine and pain in the elbows and shoulders. Dr. Chapman 
was of the opinion that surgery would not be helpful. He opined that the 
applicant would not be able to retrun to work as a miner and he determined that 
the applicant had a 50% loss of body function as a result of the industrial 
injury. This apparently was some kind of a rough estimate and was not an 
impairment rating, because in the same office note, Dr. Chapman indicates that 
he would not assign a disability rating due to the complicated nature of the 
disability. He recommended that the applicant obtain a rating from an Industrial 
Commission medical panel. ^  When Dr. Chapman completed his "final bill" for the 
carrier, on February 19, 1976, he indicated on it that the applicant was still 
unable to return to work. He noted that the applicant had a severe residual 
disability and that it was difficult to separate the possible pre-existing 
problem from the industrial portion. He again noted on this billing that the 
applicant should be seen by an Industrial Commission medical panel to be rated. 
The applicant apparently did file an application for hearing with the 
Industrial Commission sometime after his February visit with Dr. Chapman. While 
the application was being processed and the matter was being set for hearing, the 
applicant again returned to Dr. Chapman on June 22, 1976. On this visit, the 
applicant complained of pain in the shoulders, elbows and hands. Per Dr. 
Chapman's office note, this had been present prior to the date of injury for 6 
or 7 years, but had gradually become worse and quite severe within the last year. 
Dr. Chapman did shoulder X-rays and found these to be negative, but elbow and 
hand X-rays were read to show arthritic narrowing and spurring. After reviewing 
the X-rays, Dr. Chapman listed the applicant's diagnoses as: 1) progressive 
arthritis of the spine, shoulders, elbows and hands and 2) possible entrapment 
of flexor tendon, middle finger, right hand. Dr. Chapman concluded that the 
applicant was permanently disabled for his regular occupation in the coal mine 
due to progressive generalized arthritis. This was the applicant's last visit 
with Dr. Chapman. 
On August 23, 1976, the applicant attended a hearing at the Industrial 
Commission. The ALJ who heard that case referred the matter to a medical panel. 
Thereafter, the applicant saw Dr. A. MacArthur, presumably an orthopedic 
physician, on September 28, 1976. Dr. MacArthur's records are found in the 
medical record exhibit under the tab for Dr. Chapman's records. Dr. Chapman is 
associated with the Central Utah Orthopedic Clinic in Provo, Utah and it may be 
that Dr. MacArthur is also associated with that clinic. That information is not 
in the medical record exhibit. Another possibility is that Dr. MacArthur has a 
separate practice and Dr. Chapman referred the applicant there for a second 
opinion. At any rate, Dr. MacArthur's analysis of the applicant's condition is 
quite differenct from that of Dr. Chapman. Dr. MacArthur noted that the 
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applicant's chief complaint was back pain subsequent to an acute lumbar strain 
from which the applicant did not improve. He noted that the applicant was 
experiencing constant pain and stiffness, but no leg pain. Per Dr. MacArthur's 
office note, the applicant's symptoms were aggravated by any activity and the 
applicant felt he was getting worse. Dr. MacArthur's office note indicates that 
there was no numbness or weakness, no abnormal gait or stance, no spinous process 
tenderness, no sensory or motor defecits, and no spasm. He noted that the 
applicant had been under no active treatment program. He concluded that he did 
not believe that the applicant had back pain significant enough to keep him from 
working. He recommended return to work unless something could be detected by way 
of radiological studies. When Dr. MacArthur reviewed films on October 5, 1976, 
he noted that the X-rays showed only very minimal arthritic changes and nothing 
he could put together with the applicant's history and physical which would cause 
the applicant to be unable to return to work or to be restricted in his work. 
On November 24, 1976, the Industrial Commission medical panel issued its 
report (Tab D, Exhibit A-l). The medical panel read the applicant's X-rays to 
show sacroiliac sclerosis and arthritic changes along the entire lumbar spine 
consistent with the clinical impression of ankylosing spondylitis. The panel 
concluded that the applicant was physically capable of doing light work but was 
unable to do mining or mechanical work. The panel rated the applicant as having 
a 60% whole person permanent impairment (without taking into consideration his 
loss of eyesight in the left eye) and the panel attributed 10% of that impairment 
to the industrial injury because there was "a one-in-six chance that the 
ankylosing spondylitis was aggravated by the lumbar back strain on the basis of 
the progression of the X-ray changes, and this man's inability to return to 
work." The panel concluded that there was no need for future medical care 
related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident. On February 10, 1977, the 
prior ALJ in this matter issued a on order awarding the applicant permanent 
impairment benefits based on the 10% whole person impairment rated by the panel 
as being related to the industrial accident. 
While the matter was under adjudication at the Industrial Commission, 
the applicant was going through the process of applying for Social Security 
Disability benefits (see Tab L, Exhibit A-l generally). The applicant's initial 
application was denied and the applicant applied for a hearing that was held on 
June 15, 1976. After the hearing, the applicant was again denied in a decision 
issued on November 19, 1976. This decision was affirmed on appeal to the Appeals 
Council on January 18, 1977, but the matter was reopened in late 1977 as will be 
noted to follow. 
In April of 1977, the applicant was apparently rerated by the VA with 
respect to his impairment or disability. There is a medical record indicating 
that the rating was apportioned as follows: 40% anklosing spondylitis, 30% left 
eye, and 10% right elbow, for a combined rating of 60%. The ALJ is not real sure 
how these military ratings are determined, but understands that the rating system 
is not consistent with the system specified in the AMA Guides to the Evaluation 
of Permanent Impairment. 
In December of 1977, the applicant filed unspecified "new evidence" with 
Social Security that resulted in the U.S. District Court remanding the matter to 
Social Security for consideration of the new evidence. A supplemental hearing 
was conducted on May 31, 1978 and the decision to award benefits was issued on 
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July 11, 1978, That decision (found under Tab L, Exhibit A-l, pp. 157-161) notes 
that the applicant's arthritis in his hands became much worse starting in January 
of 1977. In contrast, the applicant actually noted some improvement in his back 
pain as a result of losing 30 pounds between January and May 1978 (Exhibit A-l, 
p. 158). The decision goes on to note that the industrial injury most likely had 
only a minimal effect on the applicant's disability and notes that the applicant 
was net considered disabled until the arthritis in the hands and fingers became 
acute in January 1977. The decision states: 
Assuming that the medical panel was correct, his percentage of 
disability was increased only 10% by the industrial accident. 
It does not appear the additional impairment resulting from 
the back strain would be sufficient to preclude claimant from 
all substantial work. However, the claimant maintains that in 
addition he has lost hand and finger dexterity. .. . The 
administrative law judge is impressed with the sincerity of 
the claimant when he testified that beginning in January 1977 
he lost the dexterity of in his hands. Until that time the 
claimant is not deemed to have been disabled but considering 
the credibility of the claimant's testimony as to the effect 
of arthritis in his hands and fingers together with his other 
impairments, it is found that he claimant became disabled 
January 1, 1977 which disability has been continuing. 
(Exhibit A-l, pp. 160-161). The Social Security ALJ noted that prior to the 
problems with the hands, the vocational expert indicated that the applicant was 
capable of performing light electrical work. 
There are no medical records in the medical record exhibit (Exhibit A-l) 
indicating any actual treatment for back pain or lumbar problems after 1976. In 
December of 1981, the applicant was reevaluated by Dr. C. Bench, apparently to 
determine whether Social Security Disability benefits would continue at that 
point. Dr. Bench's report is located at Tab L, Exhibit A-l(pp. 164-165). After 
examination his impression was: 1) history of low back pain and low back injury, 
rule out ankylosing spondylitis, 2) rule out rheumatoid arthritis, 3) cervical 
spondylosis with headaches, 4) traumatic injury left eye, rendered blind, 5) 
chronic sinusitis and 6) obesity. In an addendum report, Dr. Bench noted that 
the rheumatoid factor tests were negative and he revised his impressions as 
follows: 1) early cervical spondylosis with early degenerative disk disease of 
C5-6, 2) low back pain secondary to degenerative disk disease L5-S1 moderate in 
severity, 3) pain in the right shoulder secondary to some right sub-acromial 
bursitis and degenerative arthritis of the right AC joint, to a minimal degree. 
His comment was: "I think this patient's symptoms are way out of proportion to 
the objective findings which are presented." 
From February 10, 1983 through May 25, 1983, the applicant was an 
inpatient in Castleview Hospital and the University of Utah Hospital with 
extensive intestinal problems and several surgeries. The applicant had 
postoperative septicemia and renal failure with gastrointestinal bleeding and it 
was necessary for him to be monitored in the intensive care unit for several 
weeks. It is unclear what if any impairment resulted due to this extended 
intensive treatment and surgery. In May and June of 1988, the applicant 
apparently underwent cardiac evaluation as noted by the Holter Monitor tests done 
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at the Salt Lake Clinic. Those records are somewhat unclear with respect to what 
conclusions were made as a result of the tests. 
With respect to pre-existing conditions, the applicant sustained a 
perforating wound to his left cornea while working in a mine in October of 1954. 
There are a couple medical records from this incident under Tab H in the medical 
record exhibit. The applicant testified at hearing that he was hit in the left 
wrist, by a pitched ball when playing baseball in 1941, but there are no medial 
records from this incident and the applicant indicated that he had had no 
problems with the wrist subsequent to 1941. He stated that he had no breathing 
problems resulting from his years of work in the mines. 
The applicant completed the 11th grade in highschool. The applicant's 
work history includes working for the railroad for 2 years, some electrical work 
and training in the service for 4 years and thereafter in underground mines (from 
1946 through 1975). The applicant indicated that while he was employed working 
in the mines he also did some electrical contracting and furnace installation on 
the side. The applicant stated that after his back injury in 1975, he tried to 
get work as a fireboss again but was denied jobs because he could not pass the 
physical. His wife testified that the applicant did try to find work, but the 
X-rays of his back always prevented him from passing the physicals. 
The applicant was paid 25 weeks of temporary total compensation by the 
employer from August of 1976 to February of 1976. In February of 1976, he began 
receiving union disability pension benefits (amount unspecified) and he 
apparently continues to receive this along with his social security benefits 
(amount also unspecified). In February of 1977, he began receiving non-service 
connected VA disability benefits ($200.00 per month). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The ALJ finds that the applicant has failed to sustain his burden of 
proof in establishing a medical causal connection between his permanent inability 
to work and the August 7, 1975 industrial injury. The ALJ finds that there are 
two main reasons why the evidence does not support the requisite causal 
connection. First, the evidence shows that it was the arthritic condition in the 
hands and fingers that truly caused the applicant to be unable to work, not the 
ankylosing spondylitis in the lumbar spine. Second, even if one were to presume 
that the ankylosing spondylitis was causing the applicant to be disabled, the 
industrial injury did not cause the ankylosing spondylitis and only questionably 
aggravated it. 
A. The Cause of the Inability to Work: 
The July 11, 1978 Social Security Disability (SSD) decision makes it 
very clear that Social Security found that the applicant became unable to perform 
gainful employment when the arthritis in his hands and fingers became severe in 
January 1977, and not before that. The applicant was denied Social Security 
Disability benefits in a series of decisions prior to when SSD gave consideration 
to the onset of arthritis in the extremities. Therefore, Social Security found 
that the applicant's lumbar problems, even with the aggravation that may have 
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been caused by the industrial back injury, was not a sufficient disabling 
condition to cause him to be unable to perform any gainful work. The vocational 
expert who testified at the May 1978 SSD hearing indicated that there were jobs 
in the region where the applicant lived that he could have performed in 1978 
(after the industrial injury) if he had not lost the dexterity in his hands and 
fingers. The July 11, 1978 Social Security decision re-emphasizes this in very 
plain terms. Although this ALJ is not bound in any way by the findings of the 
Social Security Administration, this ALJ finds the SSD decision very relevant and 
convincing. It is convincing because other evidence presented to this ALJ, to 
be discussed below, is consistent with the SSD determination that it was the 
arthritis in the hands that caused the applicant to be totally disabled, and not 
the anklosing spondylitis in the lumbar spine, which caused the applicant to be 
only partially disabled (unable to perform the demanding work in the mines and 
as a building construction electrician). 
The applicant has argued that the arthritis in the hands and fingers is 
somehow related or was somehow caused by the lumbar condition. The February 5, 
1992 letter to the Administrator of the Employers Reinsurance Fund, noted at the 
beginning of this Order, refers to when the "lumbar problem extended into Mr. 
Zupon's extremities." Unfortunately, there is no medical evidence at all which 
even suggests that the lumbar condition and the condition in the hands and 
fingers is somehow related. The applicant has pointed out that he had no 
problems in his hands until after the industrial accident, but there needs to be 
more than just a sequential finding to say that the lumbar back strain on August 
7, 1975 caused the progressive degenerative arthritis in the hands and fingers. 
In addition, the applicant's argument is this regard is not clearly supported by 
the medical records. Dr. Chapman noted that the applicant had been having 
problems with his hands and fingers for 6 or 7 years prior to the date of injury 
and that it became more severe in 1977. It is the applicant's burden to present 
supportive medical evidence for his theories on the medical causal connection 
between the work injury and the disabling condition. In arguing that the 
arthritis in the extremities is related to the back strain, the ALJ finds that 
the applicant has failed to sustain this burden. 
B. The Contribution of the Industrial Injury? 
Although the ALJ finds that the analysis under A. above is sufficient 
to sustain a finding that permanent total disability benefits are not payable, 
the ALJ feels it is appropriate to also discuss the limited role the industrial 
injury played in the applicant's overall disability. The applicant has 
emphasized that he did not return to work after the industrial injury and has 
pointed out that a prior medical panel found that the industrial injury 
permanently aggravated his pre-existing ankylosing spondylitis. However, the 
medical evidence presented for this adjudication leaves the ALJ with some 
question regarding why the applicant did not return to work after the industrial 
injury and leaves the ALJ with some real questions regarding the prior medical 
panel's finding that the applicant sustained a 10% whole person impairment as a 
result of the industrial injury. 
After the industrial back strain on August 7, 1975, the applicant 
received only conservative care for his back for several months. No acute injury 
to the spine was ever diagnosed radiologically. Surgery was never recommended 
or performed. There are no medical records regarding treatment for the back from 
1976 forward. The 1976 medical panel concluded that the applicant would need no 
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future treatment for the back related to the industrial injury. The office notes 
of the doctors that treated the applicant just after the industrial^injury (Dr. 
Smoot and Dr. Chapman) include regular mention of pain or limited use in many 
areas of the body besides the lumbar spine. The shoulders, the mid-thoracic 
spine, the hips, the neck and the elbows are all mentioned. Dr. Smoot noted 
aches in "all joints" at one point and even mentions ear pain. The medical 
evidence seems to suggest that the applicant was experiencing symptoms related 
to what Dr. Chapman diagnosed as "progressive arthritis of the spine, shoulders, 
elbows and hands." Dr. MacArthur concluded in September 1976 that the 
applicant's back pain was not so severe* as to prevent him from working and Dr. 
MacArthur went so far as to state that the applicant needed no work restrictions. 
As late as 1981, when the applicant was re-evaluated for SSD by Dr. Bench, the 
medical conclusion was that the applicant's symptoms greatly exceeded any 
objective findings. 
In spite of the above findings, this ALJ would probably have done what 
the previous Industrial Commission ALJ did and would have given the applicant the 
benefit of the doubt by awarding the 10% whole person impairment that the medical 
panel attributed to the industrial injury. However, this would have been giving 
the applicant the extreme benefit of the doubt. This ALJ has never seen a 
medical panel finding of impairment that is based on a 1 in 6 chance that there 
might have been an aggravation. The ALJ recognizes that there is some doubt in 
any medical conclusion, but the ALJ has always been of the impression that there 
should be a greater than 50% chance before the medical experts can say something 
probably caused something else. If it is less than 50%, or a lot less as in this 
case, then the ALJ would think that the panel would have to say it is NOT more 
likely than not that the connection exists. 
Notwithstanding the highly questionable analysis of the prior panel, 
even if one concedes that the industrial injury caused 10% whole person 
impairment, this is still a very minimal portion of the applicant's overall 
disability or impairment. If not for the causation problems discussed above, the 
ALJ might find that the 1/6 contribution was sufficient to support a finding that 
the industrial injury caused the total disability. However, considering all the 
other evidence, the ALJ must conclude that there is insufficient supportive 
evidence to find that the industrial injury caused the applicant's total 
disability. As such, the applicant's claim for permanent total disability 
benefits related to the August 7, 1975 industrial injury must be dismissed. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for permanent total 
disability benefits related to the August 7, 1975 industrial accident is 
dismissed for failure to establish a medical causal connection between the 
industrial accident and the applicant's total disability. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall 
be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in 
detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed, this Order 
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
ORDER 
RE: JOHN ZUPON 
PAGE 10 
Cert i f i ed by the Industr ia l Commission 
of Utatu- Sa l t Lake City, Utah,^this 
/fUU day afrsnrJA^JJ .1992. 
ATTEST: 
^ /A^r.^n ^ ^ JZ 
Patricia O. Ashby 
Commission Secretary 
/S^~?^T 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on March /$^U) 1992, a copy of the 
attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the 
case of John Zupon, was mailed to the following persons at the 
following addresses, postage paid: 
John Zupon 
292 Welby Street 
Helper, UT 84526 
Virginius Dabney 
Attorney at Law 
350 South 400 East, #202 
SLC, UT 84111 
Edwin C. Barnes 
Attorney At Law 
77 West 200 South, #200 
SLC, UT 84111 t 
Erie V. Boorman 
Administrator 
Employers Reinsurance Fund 
Cynthia Anderson 
Associate Legal Counsel 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
Pamela Hayes 
Uninsured Employers Fund 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
•jTSX* /(VC*Y. By ^A/s** dCfi/iAs-Mrt 
Wilma Burrows 
Adjudication Division 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case Number 91000568 
John Zupon * 
* 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
* 
* 
Kaiser Steel Corporation, * 
(Self-Insured)/Uninsured * 
Employers Fund, and Employers * 
Reinsurance Fund, * 
• 
Respondents. * 
********************************* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for 
Review of respondent in the above captioned matter, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
The applicant filed a claim for permanent total disability 
benefits related to in industrial injury on August 7, 1975. A 
hearing was held on February 6, 1992. In her decision of March 18, 
1992, the administrative law judge (ALJ) denied the applicants 
claim. The applicant timely filed this motion for review and was 
granted additional time to submit a memorandum in support of his 
motion. The applicant submitted a memorandum two months after the 
time had expired for submission of his memorandum. 
1. DID THE ALJ APPLY THE WRONG STANDARD OF PROOF? 
The applicant asserts that he was prejudiced by the ALJ's use 
of a "higher standard of proof than is found in the law." It is 
unclear what "higher standard" the applicant believes was used 
here, but examination of the record indicates that the ALJ 
correctly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard to the 
issue of medical causation. See Allen v.Industrial Commission, 
729 P.2d 15, 23 (Utah 1986). The ALJ found that the applicant 
failed to establish medical causation by a preponderance of the 
evidence and denied the applicant's claim for permanent total 
disability. 
The ALJ relied on Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 
(Ct. App. 1988) which held that a showing of medical causation was 
required under Allen. U.C.A. 35-1-69 was construed to require a 
showing of medical and legal causation to support an award for 
permanent total compensation. Id. 
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2. DID THE ALX IMPROPERLY ANALYZE THE CLAIM AS ONE 
BASED ON LUMBAR PROBLEMS IN CONJUNCTION WITH 
ARTHRITIC DISABILITY IN THE HANDS AND FINGERS? 
Utah Code Annotated 35-1-69 provided that: 
If any employee who has previously incurred a permanent 
incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or congenital 
causes, sustains an industrial injury for which 
compensation and medical care is provided by this title 
that results in permanent incapacity which is 
substantially greater than he would have incurred if he 
had not had the pre-existing incapacity, compensation 
and medical care . . . shall be awarded." 
U.C.A. 35-1-69 (Supp. 1974). The statute contemplates that the 
compensation and medical care for the preexisting impairment will 
be paid out of the Second Injury Fund. Chavez, v. Industrial 
Commission, 709 P,2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1985); See Intermounta in 
Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega. 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977). 
U.C.A. 35-1-69 must be read in light of the other provisions 
of the statute. In Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P. 2d 954 
(Ct. App. 1988) the Utah Court of Appeals agreed with an ALJ of the 
Industrial Commission who found that the language of 35-1-67 
implies that there must be a causal connection between the 
industrial injury and the permanent total disability. Jd. at 956. 
The Court of Appeals held that proof of a causal connection is 
required under Allen v. Industrial Commission Id. Therefore, the 
applicant "for permanent total disability benefits must prove 
medically that his disability was caused by an industrial 
accident." Id. It is important to note that Large construes 
language in the statute that predates the 1988 amendment. 
Therefore, it appears that Large is controlling in this case and 
the applicant must show a causal connection between his industrial 
accident and his permanent total disability in order to receive 
benefits. 
The applicant asserts that Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 
704 P.2d 581 (Utah 1985) requires the Commission to apply the law 
as it existed at the time of the applicants injury. Marshall 
stands for the proposition that benefits to be awarded in workers' 
compensation cases are to be determined based on the statute as it 
existed at the time of injury. Although the applicant was injured 
in August 1975, he did not file his application for a hearing on 
permanent total disability until May 24, 1991. The relevant 
language in 35-1-67 was amended to require a showing of a causal 
connection in 1988. Thus, all case law construing the statute 
prior to 1988 should apply in the interpretation of the statute. 
Under Large, the applicant is required to show a causal connection 
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between his industrial accident and his permanent disability. The 
applicant failed to show the requisite causal connection and, 
therefore, his request for permanent total disability was properly 
denied by the ALJ. 
3. DID THE ALJ IMPROPERLY FIND THAT THE INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT WAS NOT THE MEDICAL CAUSE OF 
THE APPLICANT'S DISABILITY? 
The applicant attempted to show that the August 7, 1975 
industrial accident was the medical cause of his permanent total 
disability by showing that he never returned to work after the 
accident and that he was awarded social security disability 
benefits beginning on January 1, 1977. 
The social security decision to award benefits noted that the 
arthritis in the applicant's hands became much worse beginning in 
January 1977 and observed that the applicant's industrial injury 
most likely had minimal effect on the applicant's disability. The 
Social Security Administration (SSA) did not consider the applicant 
to be disabled until the arthritis in his hands and fingers became 
acute in 1977. Prior to that time, the vocational expert who 
testified at the SSA hearing indicated that there were jobs that 
the applicant could perform in 1978 had he not lost dexterity in 
his hands and fingers. Although the SSA hearing is not binding on 
the commission under the statute in effect at the time of the 
applicant's injury, it is relevant to determining the extent of the 
applicant's disability as well as its causal connection to the 
applicant's industrial injury. 
Examination of the applicant's medical records shows that he 
received no treatment for back pain or lumbar pain after 1976. 
Office notes of the doctors who treated the applicant immediately 
following the industrial accident regularly mention pain or limited 
use in many areas of the body, suggesting that the applicant was 
experiencing symptoms of progressive arthritis of the spine, 
shoulders,elbows and hands. Upon examination of the applicant in 
1976, Dr. MacArthur*concluded that the applicant's back pain was 
not so severe as to prevent him from working. In 1981, when the 
applicant was re-evaluated for SSA by Dr. Bench, the doctor 
concluded that the applicant's symptoms greatly exceeded his 
objective findings. Thus, the medical records do not establish a 
medical causal connection between the applicant's August 7, 1975 
industrial injury and his permanent total disability. 
4. SHOULD THE ALJ HAVE AWARDED THE APPLICANT A 
FIFTY PERCENT WHOLE PERSON IMPAIRMENT FOR THE 
PRE-EXISTING IMPAIRMENT IDENTIFIED BY THE 
1976 MEDICAL PANEL? 
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Review of the applicant's Application for Hearing and the 
record, indicates that the applicant never requested consideration 
of a claim for permanent partial disability• Under 35-1-66 (Supp. 
1974), a claim for permanent partial disability benefits must be 
filed within 8 years of the date of injury. In the present case, 
the applicant filed his'application for hearing sixteen years after 
the injury. Therefore, the time for filing an application for 
permanent partial disability benefits had run when the applicant 
filed his application for permanent total disability benefits on 
May 24, 1991. 
5. DID THE ALJ FAIL TO DELINEATE ADEQUATE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW? 
The applicant asserts that the Order fails to delineate 
adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the 
ALJ's Order in light of Adams v. Board of Review, 173 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 18 (1991) , indicates that the ALJ made findings sufficient to 
"disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual conclusions, or 
conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached." Milne Truck 
Lines, Inc. v.- Public^ Service Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 
1979) cited in Adams, at 20. The ALJ's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are sufficient to show what issues were decided, 
legal interpretations and applications made, as well as the 
subsidiary factual findings which support her decision. See Adams 
at 21. Therefore, the commission finds that the ALJ's Order 
contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to 
support her decision to deny benefits to the applicant. 
6. WAS THE ALJ'S DECISION ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS? 
Review of the record indicates that there is substantial 
evidence to support the ALJ's findings. The applicant failed to 
delineate his specific objections in sufficient enough detail to 
allow the commission to address them. However, review of the 
entire record indicates that the ALJ's findings are not arbitrary 
and capricious. 
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ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge 
dated March 18, 1992 is affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a 
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes. 
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